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VORWORT
FORUM FINANZ, die Informationsplattform des Bundesministeriums für Finanzen,
hat im Jahr 2001 bereits zum dritten Male einen Aufsatzwettbewerb für junge
ÖkonomInnen ausgeschrieben. StudentInnen und JungökonomInnen sollen dadurch
mit BMF-spezifischen Themen vertraut gemacht und an anwendungs- und politik-
orientierte Analysen gewöhnt werden. Das Bundesministerium für Finanzen erwartet
sich durch diese Arbeiten auch Inputs in die eigene Arbeit.
Die besten Arbeiten werden jedes Jahr von einer hochrangigen Jury bewertet und
mit Geldpreisen prämiert. Im Jahr 2001 hat die Jury neben anderen die Arbeit von
Frau Liliane Karlinger zum Thema „An Equilibrium Analysis of International Fiscal
Transfers as Insurance against Asymmetric Shocks“ ausgewählt. Der Preis wurde
vom Herrn Bundesminister für Finanzen persönlich an Frau Liliane Karlinger über-
reicht.
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Abstract
A static two-country general equilibrium model with uncertainty about labor
productivity is developed to analyze potential welfare gains from fiscal cooperation
under ex-ante heterogeneity of agents. The fiscal transfer scheme under
consideration is a flat uniform labor income tax redistributed as equal lump-sum
transfers. Simulations of the bargaining solution show that fiscal cooperation
generally reduces output and employment, but can be desingned to provide Pareto
improvements on the competitive market equilibrium through interpersonal risk-
pooling.
JEL classification numbers: H21, H87, E61
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1 Introduction
It has often been pointed out that the European Monetary Union (EMU) limits
national policymakers in their ability to actively stabilize output fluctuations in their
economies induced by macroeconomic shocks. In particular, EMU implies the
centralization of monetary policy and the loss of the exchange rate instrument as a
shock absorber. Loss of the latter is potentially harmful if the countries that joined the
EMU do not constitute an „Optimal Currency Area“. Countries are less likely to form
an optimal currency area if macroeconomic shocks are predominantly asymmetric,
nominal rigidities prevail in the short run, labor mobility is low and automatic
stabilization from federal taxes and government spending is low.
Empirical analyses suggest that most of these characteristics do apply to the Euro
countries (cf. Bayoumi/Eichengreen [3], Caporale [4], Christodoulakis et al. [5],
Obstfeld/Peri [14], Gros [11]). EMU, therefore, is likely to shoulder the national
fiscal authorities with a higher adjustment burden. However, the scope for national
fiscal policies to stabilize business cycle fluctuations will be limited in the EMU due to
the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty and the Growth and Stability Pact.
As a result, several authors discussed the implementation of some kind of European
Fiscal Transfer System (EFTS) designed to act as a substitute for the shock-
absorbing capacity of exchange rate realignments and to insure the countries
concerned against asymmetric shocks (e.g. Italianer/Vanheukelen [13], van Aarle
[1], Fatás [10], von Hagen/Hammond [12], Bajo-Rubio/Díaz-Roldán [2]).
The present paper intends to analyze the desirability of such an insurance scheme
in a general equilibrium framework. More precisely, we ask the question whether a
simple tax-and-transfer scheme providing insurance to production economies that
face the risk of stochastic productivity shocks would be welfare improving. The
structural characteristics of this question are related to some of the literature on
income inequality and redistributive taxation under uncertainty, like Diamond/Helms/
Mirrlees [6], Eaton/Rosen [9], Varian [15], or Easley et al. [7]. The most important
reference here is Easley/Kiefer/Possen [8], who show that in a two-period, n-agent
production economy in which productivity is subject to idiosyncratic shocks and
there do not exist contingent markets in all states, the competitive equilibrium will
not be Pareto optimal and there might be a potential for Pareto-improving
government intervention based on income-dependent taxes and lump-sum transfers
which provide insurance through interpersonal risk-pooling.
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Our analysis basically transfers this interpersonal risk-sharing principle mutatis
mutandis from the individual-agent to the country level. We will follow Easley/Kiefer/
Possen [8] in ruling out purely redistributive policies and in adopting the Pareto
criterion as the welfare measure; this choice seems natural in a situation where (two
or more) independent and autonomous countries have to agree on the voluntary
implementation of a policy measure such as the one in question. The decision
making process we have in mind implies that unanimity will be required and, hence,
that the welfare gains from our policy changes have to be noncontroversial.
Note, however, that Easley/Kiefer/Possen [8] impose complete ex-ante symmetry
(i.e. homogeneity) of agents. In particular, their results crucially depend on the
assumption that all individuals face the same distribution of the productivity
parameters. This assumption excludes distributional differences between agents (i.e.
„structural“ heterogeneity of countries) and the occurrence of positive correlation
among agents (i.e. „international“ aggregate shocks), two features that we will
frequently find in practice, as the European experience shows (cf. Christodoulakis
et al. [5]).
As Easley et al. [7] demonstrate, however, policy intervention will be welfare
improving even in the presence of aggregate shocks provided that asymmetric
shocks still occur with positive probability, an argument that can be easily verified in
the context of our model. Therefore, our analysis will concentrate on the implications
of relaxing the second assumption, i.e. the symmetry assumption, by allowing the
individuals in our model to be even ex-ante different.
We will proceed as follows: Section 2 presents the economy and its autarchy
equilibrium; section 3 introduces fiscal cooperation under distributional asymmetry
and investigates its desirability. Section 4 investigates the limits of welfare gains from
fiscal cooperation under distributional asymmetry; section 5 presents numerical
simulations of the model that will illustrate and amend the theoretical solutions
obtained before. Finally, section 6 summarizes the main results and points out to
open questions left for further research.
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2 The Economy
We consider a one-period economy with two countries indexed by i € {1, 2};
in each country, there is a representative agent who has a strictly increasing, strictly
concave, di.erentiable utility function Ui(c i, l i) defined on consumption, c i ≥ 0, and
leisure, l i ≥ 0. We assume that        =         and
These agents produce a single, homogenous consumption good using labor as
the only input. The underlying production technology is linear, where agent  i’s labor
input is l -l i ( l > 0 is the total available hours) and agent i’s labor productivity is
denoted θ i. Individual output is, therefore,
(1)
and aggregate output in the economy is
(2)
In this model, uncertainty arises from labor productivity θ i, which is a random
variable defined on two states of the world, ω € {1, 2}, that occur with known
probability p (ω) > 0 where p (1) + p (2) = 1. The state of the world is realized after
the countries agreed on the tax policies (if they choose to do so at all), but before
the individuals make their decisions on leisure and consumption and an equilibrium
is reached. The productivity for individual i in state w is denoted θ i (ω), agent i’s
consumption is denoted c i (ω), her leisure is l i (ω), and the same convention is
followed for the other variables. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
θ 1 (1) > θ 1 (2) and θ 2 (2) > θ 2 (1), i.e. state 1 is more favorable to country 1, while
state 2 is more favorable to country 2.
With consumption being the numéraire, the individuals face the following budget
constraint:
(3)
where I i (ω) is agent i’s income in state ω and w i (ω) is agent i’s real wage rate in
state ω. The competitive equilibrium without any fiscal activity (denoted „autarchy
solution“) will be characterized by the demand functions for consumption and leisure
resulting from maximizing utility        (c i, l i ) subject to the budget constraint (3):
¯
U1¯ U2¯
¯ ¯
Ui¯
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(4)
where w i (ω) = θ i (ω). This means that each agent will adjust her consumption and
leisure according to her realized labor productivity, and equilibrium prices of leisure
and consumption are exogenous.
Note that, in this framework, the agents can neither self-insure through saving (i.e.
intertemporal risk-pooling) nor buy insurance on a private competitive insurance
market, as any insurance company would have to include both agents under a single
contract, which would make competition between insurance companies incompatible
with the provision of the Pareto optimal insurance contract. However, since our
agents are assumed to be risk-averse, this competitive equilibrium will not
necessarily be Pareto optimal for want of private insurance options. Therefore, we
want to find out if the two countries can engage in a mutually beneficial form of fiscal
cooperation that (at least partly) replaces the private insurance strategies that are
not available in our case.
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3 Fiscal Cooperation under Asymmetry
The fiscal cooperation we have in mind here is similar to a negative income tax
scheme and works as follows: Before the productivity parameters are realized, the
two countries agree irrevocably to tax their citizens. labor income at a previously
announced, uniform and linear tax rate; then uncertainty is resolved, the individuals
make their decisions on labor supply and consumption, and the two countries pool
the proceeds from taxation and redistribute them equally among their citizens. This
way, unlucky low-income agents will benefit from the system as they pay less taxes
than they receive as transfers, while lucky individuals will be the net-payers of the
system; hence, there is an ex-post-redistribution of resources from the lucky ones to
the unlucky ones which corresponds to a situation of interpersonal risk-pooling.1
The economy under consideration here is thus a hybrid system of autonomy with
respect to production and consumption on the one hand (note that there is no
foreign trade in our model) and binding cooperation with respect to tax rates and
revenue redistribution on the other hand.2
Since, in the following, we restrict ourselves to linear labor income taxation, the
concept of Pareto optimality we refer to is, of course, always a conditional one. Note
further that since labor supply is endogenous in our model, full insurance is not
feasible; hence, the lucky individual.s income will always be higher than the unlucky
one.s, even in the presence of insurance.
In terms of our model as outlined in Section 2, the relevant (after-tax) wage rate is
now: w i (ω) = (1 - τ) θ i (ω), where -1 < τ < 1 is the flat labor income tax rate (or
wage subsidy if τ < 0). Total tax revenue (or subsidy expenditure) is
(5)
1 Note that the international .budget. will always be balanced as tax revenue exactly
equals transfer payments, i.e. the resource constraint is satisÞed at each point in time
(which, in our case, is necessary as we only consider a one-period economy).
2 Throughout the rest of the paper, we will impose uniformity of the underlying tax rate.
Of course, one might want to ask the question why we do not let the two countries decide
individually on the rate at which they wish to tax their citizens rather than assuming
a uniform tax rate. The intuitive answer to this question would be as follows: If both
countries agree to pool their revenue after raising the taxes individually, each country can
make itself better o. at any given .foreign. tax rate by setting the domestic tax rate to
zero; that way, it can fully beneÞt from the insurance scheme without contributing to it.
As a result, however, both countries will choose zero tax rates and the insurance system
will not come into being.
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and each individual receives a lump-sum transfer (or pays a lump-sum tax) of
½T (ω) such that the „federal budget“ will always be balanced. We assume that the
individuals act competitively, i.e. they consider the tax rate as exogenous and are not
aware of their inßuence on the transfer payments through their decision on labor
input. The new budget constraint is now
(6)
Again, maximizing utility subject to the budget constraint (6) will yield demand
functions for consumption and leisure, c i = c i (I i (ω) , w i (ω)) and l i = l i (I i (ω),
w i (ω)).
The simplest form of introducing distributional asymmetry here is to let
(7)
i.e. perfect negative correlation of θ i (ω) of the two countries’ (ex-post) performance.3
A Pareto improving tax rate will be any tax rate that increases one individual’s
indirect expected utility without reducing the other individual’s expected utility; as a
first step, let us therefore analyze under which conditions each of our two countries
would agree to a small (almost zero) tax rate independently of the other one.
Agent i’s indirect expected utility is defined by
(8)
where agent i’s indirect utility of state ω is a function of her optimal consumption and
leisure,
(9)
Note that p (1) ≠ ½ implies that EU1 (τ) ≠ EU 2 (τ ), i.e. the two countries are now
ex-ante different.
Obviously, we have
(10)
3 Note that this implies that aggregate output will be constant across states.
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4 Note that                      = y1 (ù) + y2 (ω) and that equ. (7) implies
y1 (1) = y2 (2) > y1 (2) = y2 (1).
The Lagrangian of the individual’s maximization problem is
(11)
and applying the Envelope Theorem to this expression yields
(12a)
(12b)
(12c)
Proposition 1 Under the above assumptions, there will always be a range of
strictly positive probability values, p (1)  € [ p,p ], for which a small tax-and-
transfer scheme would be beneficial to both countries,
for i = 1, 2. The values of p and p depend entirely on the marginal utilities of
consumption in states 1 and 2, which in turn depend on the degree of similarity
between the two states.
Proof: After inserting from equ. (5)4 and simplifying the appropriate terms in
equ. (10), we obtain for country 1
(13)
Let us assume that θ 1 (1) > θ 1 (2) ⇒ l 1 (1) < l 1 (2), i.e. the labor supply curve is
positively sloped; then y 1 (1) > y 1 (2) and                           , which means that the
sign of                      depends entirely on p (1). In particular,                      is
decreasing in p (1) (i.e. it will be the lower, the more probable the favorable state for
country 1 is) and it will be positive if p (1) is below a critical value p, i.e. if the state
that is favorable to country 1 is not „too probable“. It can be easily shown that
(14)
Analogous results can be obtained for country 2:
(15)
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Now,                      is increasing in p (1) and will be positive if p (1) is above a
critical value p where
(16)
Proposition 2 There is no value of p (1) € (0,1) for which both                     and
                   are negative.
Proof: Just note that                      < 0 for any p (1) > p € (½, 1), while
                   < 0 for any p (1) < p € (0,½). Obviously, p (1) can never be
larger than p and smaller than p at the same time.
The last result says that a system of small wage subsidies (which corresponds to a
strictly negative labor income tax rate) Þnanced by lump-sum taxes will never be
desirable for both countries, and hence, will never be Pareto improving. The intuition
behind this result is clear: Negative tax rates combined with lump-sum taxes would
„reward“ the lucky one (realizing the high productivity parameter) and „punish“ the
unlucky one, a mechanism which is the opposite of insurance; such a system would
therefore aggravate the uncertainty in the economy and make the risk-averse
individuals worse off.
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4 Limits to ex-ante Heterogeneity
Easley/Kiefer/Possen [8] mention that „our symmetry assumption should be
regarded as a simplifying approximation. The assumption is by no means a
necessary condition for Pareto-improving policies to exist, however, (...) too much
heterogeneity will eliminate the potential for Pareto improvement“. (p. 949)
While section 3 was devoted to exploring the potential for Pareto improvement in the
presence of asymmetry, we will now turn to the second half of the quoted sentence:
where are the limits of welfare gains from a fiscal intervention under ex-ante
heterogeneity?
First of all, note that as long as the particular type of asymmetry as introduced in
section 3 holds, i.e. θ 1 (1) = θ 2 (2) > θ 1 (2) = θ 2 (1) and 0 < p(1) < 1, we have
perfect negative correlation between the two countries, and there will be some
potential for welfare improvement even away from p (1) = ½. Therefore, let us turn to
two limiting cases where we would intuitively expect the potential for Pareto
improvement to be eliminated, namely
€ if one country is more productive than the other in both states of the world
(Case A);
€ if one country does not face any uncertainty at all, i.e. it realizes the same
productivity parameter in both states, while the other country does either better of
worse than that (Case B).
Case A can be characterized as follows: θ 1 (1) > θ 1 (2) = θ 2 (2) > θ 2 (1);
this is a razor-edge case where we assume that country 1 is weakly more productive
than country 2 in both states.
Proposition 3 If one country is weakly more productive than the other in both
states of the world, then there is no potential for Pareto improvement through
fiscal cooperation under the above assumptions.
Proof: Let us evaluate the derivatives of the indirect expected utility at a point of no
policy:
(17)
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while
(18)
Our assumptions on the distributional properties of θ i (ω) imply that y 1 (2) = y 2 (2)
which in turn implies that
(19)
Hence, country 1, which is superior in terms of productivity, will not benefit
from fiscal cooperation.
Case B can be characterized by θ 1 (1) > θ 2 (2) = θ 2 (1) > θ 1 (2). Here, country 2
faces no uncertainty at all, while country 1 does either better (state 1) or worse
(state 2) than country 2.
Proposition 4 If one country does not face any uncertainty at all, while the other
country does either better or worse than that, then there will not necessarily be a
potential for Pareto improvement through fiscal cooperation under the above
assumptions.
Proof: Let’s again analyze equations 17 and 18; after rearranging terms, we see
that
(20)
and
(21)
Note that our assumptions on the distributional properties of θ i (ω) imply that
y 2 (1) = y 2 (2). Since country 2 faces no uncertainty,                        = 1;
hence, we must have p (1) (y 1 (1) - y 2 (1)) > (1 - p (1)) (y 2 (2) - y 1 (2)) for
                    to be positive. The smaller p (1) and the smaller country 1’s productive
„advantage“ in state 1, the less likely is this condition to be satisfied. For country 1,
in turn, taxes will be the more desirable the more dissimilar the two states of the
world are to it. Hence, we can conclude that neither country 1 nor country 2 will be
necessarily interested in fiscal cooperation under the present ircumstances, and
very specific conditions have to be met for a tax scheme to be mutually beneficial.
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5 Simulations
The following simulations will illustrate the theoretical results we obtained in the
previous section for a simple economy composed of two individuals; the functional
form of the utility function is a log-version of the standard Cobb-Douglas utility
function,
(22)
The demand functions for consumption and leisure are therefore
(23)
where I i (ω) = (1- τ) θ i (ω) l + ½T (ω) is agent i’s income in state ω  and
T (ω) = τ (θ 1 (ω) (l - l 1 (ω))+ θ 2 (ω) (l - l 2 (ω))) is total tax revenue. Again, indirect
expected utility is EU i (τ ) = p (1)U i (1) + (1 - p (1)) U i (2).
5.1 Individually Optimal Tax Rates
Every tax rate that solves the following Pareto optimization problem can be
considered Pareto optimal:
(24)
where C is some constant s.t. C ≥ EU j (τ  = 0), and -1 < τ  < 1. However, as soon
as we allow for p (1) to be di.erent from p (2) (which implies that also
EU 1 (τ ) ≠ EU 2 (τ )), we should expect to find more than one such tax rate at each
level of p (1). Therefore, let us first turn to the unconstrained optimization problem
for country 1.
The standard parameter values to be used in the following (unless specified
otherwise) are: α = 0.5, θ 1 (1) = 2, θ 1 (2) = 1, θ 2 (2) = 2, θ 2 (1) = 1, l = 10, which
corresponds to the distributional asymmetry as introduced in section 3 where
θ 1 (1) = θ 2 (2) > θ 1 (2) = θ 2 (1).
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Figure 1 shows the graph of EU 1 (τ) for different values of p (1), namely for
p (1) = 0.1 (dashed line), p (1) = 0.5 (solid line) and p (1) = 0.9 (dotted line); we see
that expected utility is not monotone in the tax rate and that it shifts upward and
flattens as p (1) increases. The small circles represent the loci where expected utility
is maximized; we can observe that the individually optimal tax rate for country 1
seems to decrease as p (1) increases.
Figure 2 shows the individually optimal tax rates for country 1 and 2 as functions of
p (1). We find that while the optimal tax rate for country 1, τ *1, decreases and even
turns negative as p (1) increases, i.e. as the state more favorable to country 1
becomes more probable, the optimal tax rate for country 2, τ *2, is negative for low
values of p (1) and increases as the state unfavorable to country 2 becomes more
probable.; the two curves intersect at p (1) = 0.5 where the two countries are ex-ante
fully identical. Away from p (1) = 0.5, however, a certain conflict of interest arises.
As we should expect from our findings of section 3, there is a common (symmetric)
range of p (1)-values where both τ *1 and τ*2 are positive (namely the interval (", ()),
but there is no value of p  (1) for which both tax rates will be negative.
Figure 1: EU 1 (τ) for p (1) = 0.5 (solid), p (1) = 0.9 (dotted), and
p (1) = 0.1 (dashed)
Figure 2: Optimal Tax Rates for Country 1 (solid) and Country 2 (dotted)
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5.2 The Social Solution
Figure 2 showed that the fully symmetric case (at p (1) = ½) is the only case where
the individual optimum will correspond to the social optimum, i.e. the individually
optimal tax rate is also the unique Pareto optimal tax rate. In all other cases,
determining the social optimum is not so straightforward. We will usually find a
variety of tax rates that have a Pareto improving e.ect, but none of them will
simultaneously maximize both individuals’ expected utility. Hence, we could either
introduce some sort of policy maker or social planner who maximizes a social
welfare function, or we could let the two countries enter a bargaining process where
they divide the gains from their fiscal cooperation among each other. The latter
approach, which seems more natural in our specific framework, will be followed
below.
The bargaining procedure underlying the following analysis is a Nash bargaining
process as represented by the following maximization problem:
(25)
In our framework, expected utility at τ = 0 is the natural threatpoint as every country
is free to refuse cooperation in which case the autarchy solution is the best feasible
outcome. The parameter β in the Nash product represents relative bargaining power
of the two countries.
To get the flavor of the possible results, let us analyze the case of p (1) = 0.45.
Figure 3 depicts the peak of the utility possibility set above the threatpoint for
country 1 (x-axis) and country 2 (y-axis) for different values of τ , namely
0 ≤ τ ≤ 0.24. The way to read this graph is as follows: the small cross at the lower
left-hand corner of the graph represents the autarchy solution; as we increase the
tax rate, we increase both countries’ expected utility up to a point at τ = 0.128
(represented by the left-hand circle) where country 2’s EU is maximized; if we
further increase τ , we keep on improving country 1’s outcome while country 2’s EU
now falls below its maximum value. At a tax rate of 0.207, country 1’s expected utility
is maximized (represented by the right-hand circle); if we continue to increase τ,
both countries will fall below their respective optimal outcomes. During the
bargaining process, the two countries have to agree on some point on the utility
possibility set between their most preferred positions, for instance on the point
represented by the small box in Figure 3 where τ = 0.15229.
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Figure 4 shows the individually optimal tax rates for country 1 and 2 as well as the
Nash bargaining outcomes (the argmax of the Nash product)
Figure 3: Utility Possibility Set (EU 1 on the x-axis, EU 2 on the y-axis) for
0 < τ < 0.2
for various values of p (1) under standard parametrization. We see that the Nash
bargaining tax rates are all positive, symmetric around p (1) = 0.5 (which is due to
the fact that we assumed symmetric bargaining power, β = 0.5) and slightly above
the smaller desired tax rate (reflecting the necessary compromise between the two
countries that was determined in the Nash bargaining procedure); at p (1) = 0.5, the
Nash bargaining tax rate coincides with the individually optimal tax rates which, in
turn, coincide with the social optimum.
Let us now compare the outcome under different regimes; Figure 5 showes
expected utility for country 1 under autarchy (solid), fiscal cooperation (dotted), and
the benchmark case of full insurance5 (dashed) as functions of p (1). We see that
under fiscal cooperation, expected utility is no longer a linear function of p (1). The
largest utility gains from insurance are realized between p (1) = 0.4 and p (1) = 0.5,
where we can also observe the highest Nash bargaining tax rates. Above p (1) = 0.5,
the utility gains for country 1 decrease as country 1 is less and less likely to benefit
from the system. Compared to the (unfeasible) full insurance scenario, the utility
gains from insurance appear to be rather modest.
5 which was calculated using the same (completely inelastic) labor supply under
autarchy (i.e. (1 - α) l ), but now assuming that it is exogenous
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Morover, note that under fiscal cooperation, output and leisure will vary with the
probability of the two states (because of varying tax rates), which is not the case
under autarchy or full insurance. Fiscal cooperation leads to a drop in output and
„employment“ (i.e. leisure will be higher) compared to both autarchy and full
insurance. These losses in terms of output and employment can be interpreted as
the distortions induced by the tax scheme. We see, however, that the individuals
would be better off under fiscal cooperation than under autarchy; in particular, the
utility gains from insurance are greatest where output is lowest, namely around
p (1) = 0.5. Obviously, neither consumption nor employment are appropriate
measures of social welfare.
Figure 5: Country 1’s expected utility under autarchy (solid), fiscal
cooperation (dotted) and full insurance (dashed) for different values of p (1)
Figure 4: Individually desired tax rates (solid) and Nash bargaining outcomes
(dotted) for β = 0.5
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6 Conclusion
The present paper intends to analyze the desirability of a system of international
fiscal transfers as insurance against asymmetric shocks in a general equilibrium
framework. More precisely, a static two-country general equilibrium model with
uncertainty about labor productivity was developed to analyze potential welfare gains
from fiscal cooperation under ex-ante heterogeneity of agents.
We found that a simple tax scheme with uniform flat labor income tax rates and
lump-sum transfers can be welfare improving even in the presence of (limited)
structural heterogeneity of agents, while a system of wage subsidies financed by
lump-sum taxes will never be desired by both countries, and hence, will never be
Pareto optimal.
Since, in the so-called fully symmetric case, the agents are ex-ante identical, the
individual and social optimum will coincide and there will be a unique Pareto-optimal
tax rate. In all other cases, a certain conflict of interest arises between the two
countries and determining the social optimum is not so straightforward. Hence, we
decided to let the two countries enter a bargaining process to determine the
common tax rate. We found that the largest utility gains from insurance were
realized in the neighborhood of the symmetric case, where we could also observe
the highest Nash bargaining tax rates.
We also found that fiscal cooperation leads to distortions in terms of output and
„employment“ (i.e. leisure will be higher) compared to both autarchy and full
insurance. We could observe, however, that the individuals would be better off under
fiscal cooperation than under autarchy; in particular, the utility gains from insurance
are greatest where output is lowest.
Further research will be required to consider the e.ects of other forms of taxation,
like a consumption tax, a combination of both consumption and labor income
taxation, previously determined unilateral tax rates, or non-linear tax rates. Another
interesting extension would be to allow for intertemporal transfers, e.g. by including
capital as a second factor of production.
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